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In the Ilake of Uurneane K:H rlll;j. man) eHleuc..."'S from the Gulf regIOn began the difficult 
process of deciding IIhether 10 rebulld or rcst:1TI elscllherc. We examine pre-Katrina Gulf 
rc~idems' decision 10 re\llm 10 the po~tdisaster Gulf region I\hich lIe c:tll the "return 
migration" dt'Cision. We estimate IWo ,cparale return migf:llion mOOel,. fir~1 using data from 
:1 mail SUf\'CY of individu:tls III Ihe alTL'Clcd region and thcn rocu~ing on sclf-:ldministcred 
questionnaircs of cvaeUt'Cs in lI otl~lOn. Our rcsults indicale that retum migration can be 
alTccted b) household income: :Ige: nlucation le"eI: and employment. marital. and home 
ollncr~hip ~tatus. bUI the result' depend on the population under eon,ideration. We find no 
efft'Ct of "t:onn~'Ction to phu:e" on the return migrlltiOIl docision. I\lthough the elTcct of income 
I~ rd:lll1e1) small within subS;lntplcs. we fi nd a much higher proportion of middle income 
hou.loCholds planning to return tlmn lower illcome hou.)Chold~ IIhen eomp;lring :Ieross the 
,ubwmplcs. In lldditio n. the re:jl I\;tge differential betll('Cn home and ho~t region innuenccs the 
hl..ellhood of reI urn. L:trger impheit COSts. in tcrnls of foregone w:t~'(.'S for returning. induce 
a 10ller hkelihood of return. Exploiting IhlS difference al the mdilldu:jl le\el. "I.' are able to 
proout'C estimates of wllImllne)s 10 p:ty ~ \\ifp) to return home. AI eragc \\ifl' to return hOllle 
for a sample of rciativciy poor hou,;cholds is estimated al S1.9-l per hour or S3954 per year. 
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1. Inl roduclion 
Upward of o ne million residents of the greater metropolitan ew Orle:tns area e\'acuilted 
011 27 ;lIId 28 {\ ugust 2005. just before H urricitne K ;ttrina ~truck the Gulf Coast. Evacuccs front 
other parts of Louisiana. Mississippi. and Alabama ned the coast in large numbers. marking 
lI urricane Katrin:t as the largest popUlation displal"ClI1clI1 in the U nited States since the D ust 
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Bowl of the 1930s (Fillk, Hunt. and Hunt 20(6). Postdisaster rcalvery and rebuilding in the 
Gulf region requires understanding the existing risks. communicating those risks to the pUblic. 
rethin king Iilnd use. deciding on methods to correct deficicncies in public infrastructure. and 
providing incentives for economic recovery that will give firms and households an opportunity 
to survi\'c and thrive. In the case of New Orleans. recovery could take up to II yea rs o r more 
( K:Hes et al. 2006). Although many issues remain to be resolved in determining what will 
become of New Orlea ns and the Gul f region. the economic. social. and cultural future of the 
Gulf region will be significant ly innuenced by who decides to return . In the face of va riable but 
widespread destruction. salient vulnerabilit y. and uncertain prospects. evacuees must choose 
whcther to return to their homes. 
As Katrina approached. Alabill11a. Mississi ppi. and Louisi:lIlil all issut.'<i mandatory 
evacuation orders. I n New Or\cans. 70.000 people remained. some by choice. but most without 
me:IIlS of eseape (U.S. Congress 2006b). Many evacuees who sought refuge from K.urina hild 
nowhere to ret urn to after the stonn. Immediately after the storm. roughly 275.000 pt.'Ople were 
forced into group shel ters (FE MA 2006a). Between mid-August and mid-November 2005. 
250.000 people lost their jobs (U.5. Congress 2006a). Without homes o r jobs. many people were 
forced to decide whether to restock ilnd rebu ild their lives along the Gu lf coast or to seek out 
a new lociltion for residence. The National Hurric.lIle Service estimated the total damage losses 
from Katrina at 58 1.2 billion (NWS 2006). In the 117 hurricane·aITccted counties of Ihe Gulf 
Coast. 40 declincd in population between July I. 2005. and J:lIluary I. 2006 (Frey and Singer 
2006). The greatest population losses occurred in the parishes and counties holding New 
Orleans. Louisiamt: Gulfport- Biloxi. Mississi ppi: Lake Chal'les. Louisiana: Pascagou la. 
Mississippi: and Mobile. Alabama. 
In this paper. we examine the decision 10 return to the posldisaster Gulf region which we 
call the "return migration" decision. We review economic models of household migration and 
build on historical :lIld empirical eviden t.-c of migr:lIion behavior to postulate on determinants 
of postdisaster return migrat ion. We ident ify important research questions that can be 
examined with re turn migration data . We explore stilted preferred return migration behavior 
using a number of data sets collected in the wake of Hurricane Ka trina and make some 
inferences about socioeconomic determinants ;md eITeets of the return migration decision. 
2. Economic Models o r I-Iouschold M igra tion 
Economists have long recognized that economic f.lctors innucnce the migrat ion patterns 
of households. SjaasHld (1962) provides athcoretical frilmework for the decisioll to migr'lle. 
defining the problem in terms of a household's search to m:tximb:e the net economic return on 
human cilpiwl. In this fr:unework. migTlllion is viewed as an equilibrating force in the labor 
market real wage diITerences between regions or cit ies creale arbitrage opportunities th:1I can 
be realized by migration. leading to a redistribution of households across the landscape. Early 
models rocused 0 11 intersp;nial wage diITcrentials. distlmee between origi n .md destination. 
labor market conditions (such as unemployment rate and growth in employment). and 
household characteristics as factors detcrmining migmtion nows (Greenwood 1975: Graves 
1979. 1980: Greenwood and Hum 1989). 
Models of household migr.Hion Iypically employ a modificd gravity modeling structure. 
Migration nows are assumed to be proportional to origin ~lIld destination populations. but 
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inversely related to distance. It has been well documented that migration rates decli ne with 
distance. al though it is generally believed thilt otll-of-pocket monetary expenses could not alone 
explain th is phcnomcnon. Moving expenses tend to bc a relatively small pan of the net returns 
to migrating. O ther explanations include opportunity costs of timc, psychic costs of moving 
(diminution of conl:lct with family and friends. change of environment. etc.). higher search 
costs associated with greater distances. and uncenai11lY about destinatio ns (G reenwood 1997). 
T he existence of these potential barriers to migration has created concern about the efficacy of 
migration in re.,lIoC<t1ing resources in response to changing market and demographic 
conditions. 
Migration decisions va ry .tcross individual households. Economic factors such as worker 
skills ilnd employment StaiuS will influence returns to migration. Life cycle considerations and 
the a vailability of information could also influence migr'll ion. One would expect some 
correspondence between migra tion a nd changes in life siages- for exa mple. chi ld ren moving 
a\\"'y from home. the completion of school bY:l family member. marriage. d ivorce. reti rement. 
etc. EXIx:ctations o f obtaining gainful em ployment depend on flow of info rmat ion o f 
employmenl opportunities, which migh t explain why previous-period net migration rates are 
positively correla ted with current migration trends (Greenwood 1969). Social net works could 
playa role in learning about bbor market opport uni ties a nd providing support for migration . 
Especially .unong race·ethnic minority groups. research suggests that migril t ion pallerns tend 
to follow well-worn pathways and networks ( Be.m and Tienda 1987; Fa rley and Allen 1987; 
Barringer. Gardner. and Levin 1993). 
Individuals might also be influenced through learning l,bout ameni ties in different 
loclltions. Sjaaslad (1962) consid~red location-spttific amenities (including climate. smog. and 
congestion) as factors that might alTeet returns to migTlllion. but characterized them as 
unimportant in cv:duating migration as a red istributive mechanism because they entail no 
resource cos\. T his notion docs suggest. however. that loca tion-specific amenities might alTcct 
the reservation wage of households and. thus. Ihat wage schedules could be condi tional o n 
amenity le\·cls. A subsequent br.tndl of li terature ildopted this perspective. ilssuming thu t 
wages. rents. and the prices of locally produced nontradcd goods adjust in response to location· 
specific exogenous fa ctors. such as local cnvironmen\lll condi tions o r fiscal considerat ions. so 
that utility :lnd profit levels (rat her than wages and land rents) are eq u.,lizcd across regio ns. 
Under this clwracterization. persistcnt diITcrenees in wages and rents compens;lIe for amenity 
levels: Ihey need not eq ualize .,,·ross regions or cities in the long rtln unless the locations have 
iden tical .ullenilies. 
Roback (1982) shows how wages and land rents ilre sim ultaneously delertnined in an 
equilibrium selling. conditional on the level of local amenities. In this context, amenities are 
nonmanufact ured att ributes that :Ire v.,l ued by households- such as te11l1x:rature. rainfall. and 
clean liness of environment- or goods and services that vary in a vailability spatially- such as 
professional sports teams. performing arts. cultural resources (i.e .. museums). etc. In Roback's 
model. interregional wages and rent difTcrcntials Cim persist and will reflect the value of 
location-specific .Hllenities. This formulation of household migwtion follows the hedonic model 
forma lized by Rosen (1974). in the sense thaI implici t values of location·specific a menities are 
reflected in the markets for labor. land. and other locally prod uced goods a nd services. 
Clark and Cosgrove ( 1991) e;«tmined the persistency of interregional wage different ials. 
T hey found evidence that supports both the human capital "pproach of Sjaastad and the 
compensating diO'eretltials model of Roback. Amenities tcnd to havc it significant negative 
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effect on w;lges, but wage differentials persist across regions, evcn whcn amenities are 
contro lled. Greenwood et al . (1991 ) pro \·ide evidencc of diS(,'<juilibrium in U.S, intcrnal 
migration between states- real income in amenity-rich states tends to be too high and real 
income in amenity-poor are:ts tends to be too low. 
Frey ilnd Lillw (2005) identify cultura l constraints- such ilS thc nccd for social support 
network s, kinship tics. and ;lccess 10 informal cmployment opportunities- as sh;lping the 
migrat ion pallerns of racc-ethnicit y groups. Empirical evidence suggcsts that mi nority 
residcnce in an cthnically conccntratcd metropolitan arca can inhibit oUI-migration (Tienda 
and Wi lson 1992). Thus. persistent differentials could renect cullural conSlmints in ;I number of 
ways: racc-ethnic groups might Ir,werse well-worn migration routes with less attention paid to 
wage differentials at other possible destinations. or connections to pl<lcc ' might inhibit out-
migr.ltion . The impliclnions of this line of reasoning are that migmt ion might not engender 
complete efficiency in the allocat ion of labor :lcross spacc bcc<luse social :lnd personal 
constraints could inhibit labor now. Greenwood et al. (1991) suggest that persistent wage 
differenli:lls are relativel y small. so that efficiency loss could be minor. However. exploration 
and inference about social connections is something that. to our knowledge. has 1I0t been 
explored. Such an analysis is best pu rsued with microlevel data . 
3. Examining Return Migration 
A number of papers ha ve looked a t the decision to cV:lcuate before hurricane I;lndfall 
(Baker 1991 ; Dow and Cuttcr 1997; Gladwin ;lnd Pe<lcock 1997; Whitehead et OI l. 2000; 
Whitehead 2005). Results generally suggcst that sto rm intensity. cvacuation o rdcrs. perception 
of nood risk. type of residcnce. pet ownership. and race/ethnicit y innuencc the likelihood of 
evacuation . Whitehead (2005) finds some evidencc to support the v:!lidity of stated evacu,lIion 
preference data. 
Postdisaster migration has bt.ocn much less researched. A disastcr large enough to C;lUse 
widesprcad displacement of a population will often causc extensive dam:lge to personal 
properl y ;lIld infrastructure. limiting the ability of evacuees to rcturn to their homes. businesses. 
and communities. Depending on the severity of the disaster. return access could be limited fo r 
weeks o r months. Unccrtilinty about the timing and composition or return migration c,m 
h'lInper the recovery process bt.'Cliuse many (:conomie. civic. and social functions are largely 
population dcpendenl.2 The nature of return migration also affects reconstruction. in that 
project prioritizillion and infrastructure cllpacity depend on the rcturning population. 
Ellioll and I>ais (2006) examine evacuation. short-term recovery. emotional stress and 
support , ;lnd likelihood of return for Gulf coast residents in the wake of Hurricane Katrina. 
They find a high degree of uncertainty regarding Ihe likelihood of return fo r those households 
still displaced one month after the storm . They find homeowners :Ire more likely to return th:tn 
those that do no t own property. Howcver. Ihosc whose homes were destroyed by the storm arc 
Icss likely to return. They also find that lower-income households are more likely to return. 
Falk . Hunt , and Hunt (2006) arguc tlillt amuent households should be morc likely to rc turn 
I "Plau:" IS defined as 3 g~ographlGd umt In which Idc nl!1y IS grounded (G kryn 2000) 
~ Fo r eX:lmplc. ~ 5Ur\ey of previous residents one ).:ar ~ f1 er a dC\"aslaling earthquake re\'c;tlcd tha I 74% of unskilled 
workel"$ had nOI returned to lhe :lrea. w'herc:I ~ only 4O':f, or sl: illed wor kcl"$ dId nOI relurn (Ho wden ~t ~ t. t977 ). 
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postdisaster because they are likely to be displaced to closer locations and they have beller 
resources to make the return trip. In the case of nooding disilsters. :lmuent households are 
more likely to own homes in areas less li kely to ha\'e been nooded and h:lve beller resources to 
rebuild in the event that their home has been damaged. Note th:lt the resu lts of Ell ioll and Pais 
(2006) correspond with households that had not returned one mon th after Ihe dis:lster. Thus. 
they arc conditioned on their sample selection- those households th:lt did not immediately 
return. As such. the conjecture of Falk. Hunt. and Hunt (2006) might upply 10 the genenll 
population of evacuces. 
Elliott and Pais (2006) :lIso consider the effect of race. gender. age. timing of evacuation. 
whether the respondents are parents. and employment status on the likelihood of return. They 
find no statistical support for the significance of these cova riates in the return migration 
decision. Falk. Hunt. and Hunt (2006) speculate on the importance of sense of place as a factor 
affecti ng the likelihood of return. They note that sense of place is likely to increase in st rength 
when fmnilies or communities exist in :111 area for an extended period of time. perhaps over 
a number of generations. Sense of place could keep households in an area through bad timcs-
such as loss of job. economic recession. social tu rmoil. or natural disaster- even when moving 
elsewhere could afford beller opportunity. As such. sense of place might play :I role in 
persistent wage and land rent differentials identified in the economic migration litera tu re. This 
notion is related to thc psychic costs of moving ident ified by Sjaastad (1962). Sense of place 'l!1d 
a desire to rekindle community and social connections could affect the [ikelihood of return. 
Population disp[aeement because of natural disaster otTers an opportunity to examine the 
importance of scnse of p[aee in migration decisions. Displacement creates an exogenous shock 
that uproots households that might havc never chosen to [eave their current [oc:llion. despite 
differences in wages. prices. or amenities in other areas. How do those households then respond 
given the cu rrent opportuni ties for employment and quali ty of life in their di sp);lced location 
and their connection to the place from which they vacated? This choice likely depends on sense 
of place and conneetion to cult ure. With the right kind of data. one could e"xamine the 
importance or culture anti sense of place in the return migration d .. :cision and. by examining 
contingent wages in the displaced ,1l1d home locat ions. could possibly get a sense of the 
compensating real wage differentials that would alTcct migration despite connection to place. 
Postdisaster perceptions could also aflect the likelihood of return. Natural disasters can 
expose shortcomings of certain locations or the way humans have developed the landscape leading 
to ehanging perceptions of vulnerability. Those that perceive areas in which they previously lived 
as suddenly morc vulnerable would be less likely to return. Likewise. mist rust of government to 
provide risk management and handle emergency services cou ld also innuence return migration to 
high·hazard areas. Finally. expectations of housing and job availability. as well as overal1 
economic outlook. could affect return migration. In the next $Cction. wc develop an econometric 
model of the likelihood of postdis:lster ret urn that takes these aspects into account. 
4. Return Migration Decision 
Consider the return migration decision of a household that has recently evacuated before 
a natural disaster. We consider this household disp[:Iced if they cannot immediately return to 
their home after the occurrence of the disaster. Inabi[ity to return cou ld renect damage to their 
home or community. loss of cri tical infrast ructure (such as roads. power. or nood protection). 
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distam;e traveled for evacuation. uncertainty relatcd 10 h:lbitability of their home or 
continuation of cmployment. or some combination of these fatto rs. We assume household 
decision making adheres to the tenets of rational choice; thus. the decision to retu rn 
postd isaster renects a weighing of benefits (8) and costs (e). Thus. the probability of return is: 
Pr(rClllfII = I) = Pr{B < C). ( I ) 
where r('fllrt! is a dummy variable indicating intention to return: 8 renects connection to place. 
perceptions of vulnerability. damage to home and community. likelihood of reengaging in 
employment. and the likelihood of friends and family returning: and C renecls distance 
evacu:lted and wage differen tials in the horne and host ci ties. The C vector might also inel ude 
differences in prices and amenities in the home and host cities. 
Thus. quality of life factors and home·specific factors. such as connections to place :md 
individual perceptions and expectations of future conditions. should playa role in the decision 
to relUrn. Under the assumption that evacuees can find ajob in Iheir hosl and home cities. a cOSt 
of return ing home is the change in real wages lI!\sociatcd with the return. With persistcnt 
interregional wage d ifferentials. the loss in real wages stemming from return migration could be 
significant. On the other hand. wages in the host region cou ld be less than Ihat of the home 
region. so the wage diffcrential would be a negative cosl. The wage di fferential will renect 
economic conditions in the home and host city and labor characteristics of the household. 
The household return migration decision has implications fo r the econom ic and social 
reco\'ery of the region affected by nalUral disaster. The pool of labor thaI returns (e.g" skilled 
vs. unskilled) could affect t.'Conomic activity lind industry performance. Although we would 
expect market adjustments to equilibrate demand and supply of labor over time. shortages or 
gl uts of specific types of labor cou ld cause short-term problems in recovery. The availability of 
housing could exacerbate1:lbor problems- if unskilled labor tends to rent housing and rental 
properties are neglected in early recovery efforts. then the return rate of unskil led I,tbor could 
be relatively low. This could be a problem for New Orleans because the tourism-based economy 
of the city relics heavily on unskilled labor (Fa lk. Hun\. and Hunt 2006). Demographics of 
returning households have implications for the public and private sectors of the economies-
arc families wilh school·age children likely to return? How should local school distr icts plan for 
thei r retu rn? 
The rcturn migration decision can also be explored from the standpoint of non markct 
val uation. Consider the economic value of returning home. maximum willingness to pay 
(WTP). with JIITP .. = x/~ + c,. whcre Xi is a vector of household characteristics and ';,. is an 
independenl and identically distributed logistic nllldom error term with zero mean. The 
conditional prob:lbilit y of return can be rewritlcn 
Pr(rl'lUrn = l jx i) = Pr[ IVTP;(x;, 1:1) > C) .3 (2) 
Consider the real wllge differential as the primary COSI of return: Ci = 11',,,,,,, - 1\',,,,,,,<,, Ignoring 
ot her potential costs.~ we have 
J Haab and ,\kConncli (2002) iliusl r:Ile Ih:lt the willingnl'Ss 10 pay function approach is l'tluh,:t!cnl 10 a mility differcnl'C 
model (thc b~sis of most discMc choice modds) if utility is linear in paramcters and the marginal utility of income is 
constant across the di;;<:rctc choice States (ill our ~asc. going home or remaining in the host cily) . 
• Ikcausc they are likely to be wry small relati\'c to the present value of the wagc dilTerential and " 'in only be incurred 
once. wc ignore the pcruni:lry and lime costs of return . 
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Pr(rl'lIIrn ~ Ilxi) ~ Pr ('l,p + L, > C,) 
Pr(c, > C, - .r;p) 
(3) 
Pr (x;p - C, > c;) ~ 
~ I' , ((.<~ - c,) / O > , ,) . 
where::; is a standard logistic random va riate and 0 = (l"!1l 2/3. s As recognized by Cameron and 
James (1987), this formul:lIion of a dichotomous choice model allows for identification of point 
estimates of p and calculating filled values of WTP, because the scale parameter is identified 
due to the inclusion ofa ra ndom cost parameter. The parameter estimate on Cfromthe logistic 
regression is a point estimate of -110. so p in Equation 3 can be recovered through a simple 
transformation. In our case. the evacuation location must be exogenously imposed on the 
household to render !I·k"." a random w'lge ofTer and. thus. Ci exogenous to the household. The 
expected benefit of return home fo r the ,\Verage household is calculated as 
WTP = (4) 
where .\' is a vector of average household characteristics and Pc is the parameter esti mate of the 
wage difTercnce.6 Conlidcnce intervals for WTP can be calculated with the Krinsky- Robb 
Monte Carlo procedure (Krinsky and Robb 1986). 
S. Empirical Analysis 
The eye of Hurricane Kat rina made landfall in so utheast Louisiana at 6: 10 a.m. on August 
29, 2005. At landfalL Katrina had maximum winds of 125 mph. making it the third most 
intense hurricane on the U.S. record (NWS 2006). Hurricane Katrina devastated the Gulf 
coast. The National Weather Service (2006) reports that in Mississippi. the storm surge reached 
28 feet in certain locations. In Louisiana and Alabama. the storm su rge arrived at well above 
10 feet. Along the Mississippi coast. the storm surge penetrated at least 6 miles. where 
prelimimlry estimates indicated 90% of structures within a half a mile of the coast were 
destroyed (C BS 2005: NWS 2(06). In New Orleans. levee breaches nooded 80% of the city. In 
all. Hurricane Katrina a fTcc ted roughly 90.000 square miles (FE MA 2006b). 
In response to Hurricane Ka trina. the Center for Natural Hazards Resea rch at East 
Caroli na University conducted two separate surveys. each containing questions relevant to the 
evacuation beha vior of individu'lls living within the affected areas. 7 The two surveys were both 
random samples of individuals in the afTected region, as defined by U,S. Postal Service.R In 
both cases. we used a modified Dillman approach consisting of initial postcards indicating an 
upcomi ng survey and mul tiple waves of mailed surveys nnd follow-up postcards. We uscd firs t-
I Line 3 of Equation 3 only holds for symmetric distribution of '. The lOGIstic distribution is symmetric . 
• WTP measure assum~'S constant marginal uullty of IIlcomc. 
7 These SUf\'cys werc Ih~ rcoull of t" 0 Nat ion,1I Scicnce Found" I ion gntnls: "SGE R: COlll.'ClinG Economic I mpac, Da,a: 
tmplications for Disaster Are"s and Host Regions" (Cr.1 S 0553108): ,,,,d "SG ER : The 'New' New Orle'lns: £valu"l ing 
l'rercrcn~"t':5 for Rebuilding I'lans after Hurricane Kalrina" (SES 055-1987). 
I These samples "ere purchased from Sur\cy Sampling of Falrfidd. CT. 
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class postage to ensure that the U.S. Postal Service would send our postcards and surveys to the 
household's forwarding address and requested return service so that we could keep track of 
those households that could not be reached via mail. Survey I. which focused on the 
expenditure patterns of evacuees. had two waves of mailed surveys and survey 2. which focused 
o n opin ions of and preferences for rebuild ing projects in New Orleans, consisted of three waves 
of mailed surveys. Survey 2 also induded additional phone contact to encourage participa tion. 
In survey I, our final targeted sample totaled 2474 individuals within the affected region. O f 
these 2474 individuals, 597 retu rned surveys- a 24% response rate. Survey 2 targeted 3532 
individuals, of which 730 returned surveys- a 21 % response ra te. Surveys I and 2 were then 
combined to produce the first set of estimates (M ail Survey in Table I). 
The second set of estimates uses data collected by researchers at Rice University.9 This 
survey targeted Kat rina evacuees in Houston. Texas, and consists o f three waves of self-
administered questionnai res over a one-year period. The first wave focused on individuals 
located in evacuation shelters throughout Houston in earl y September 2005. T he second wave 
occu rred in la te October through early November of 2005 in motds and apartment complexes 
in the city. T he third wave occurred in J uly 2006 in apartment complexes. In all. we used 756 
observations between the three waves of data. Wi lso n and Stein (2006) compa red descriptive 
statistics for each wave to other surveys investigating Katr ina evacuees in Ho uston. For 
a detailed descrip tion of the survey methodology. sec Wilson and Stein (2006). 
We used logist ic regressions to analyze evacuees' stated preference decision to return to 
their predisaster residence after Hurricane Katrina. It is assumed that the probability of return 
depends on a set of individual and household characteristics according to 11 logistic cumulative 
distribut ion func tion as follows: 
exp(·\JIl) 
Pr(retllrn = I) = A(x'll) = "-c''''c+,= 
[1 + "p( ,"~)]' 
(5) 
where Pr(ref1lrn = I) is the pro bability that an evacuee returns 10 the pre-Katrina residence 
given a vector of indi vidulli and household characteristics x. and A represents the logistic 
cumulative distribution function. The Il parameters arc estimated by the maximum li kelihood 
method . 
The vecto r x varies across our data sets. but in general includes income level of the 
household. la bor characteristics of the household. indicators of cultural and social connection 
to the previous place of residence. and demographic characteristics. For the en tire popu la tion 
of Hurricane KatriJll! evacuees, we expect that incomc will have a positive elTect on the 
likelihood of retu rnin g. ret1ecting access to financial resources to aid in ret urn and recovery. 
Imporl<lnt labor characteristics could include work history and experience. such as whether 
members of the household a rc currently employed and whether they were employed before the 
disaster. Household social and cultu ral con nection indicators could include length of residence 
at the home location, intergcnerational connections to the home area. and membership in 
a race-ethnic group that has special significance in the home area. Demographic characteristics 
that might affect the return migration decision include age. education. m:!rital status. and 
9 T he Uouston evacu~ stud}' was sponsored by the Nationat Science Foundation '"SGER: Cooper,lIion among 
Evacuees in the A ftcrmalh of H urricanc Katrina" (SES 0552439). Th{" gram was awarded 10 Dr. R ick Wilson. chair of 
the Department of Potitic"l Science and the Herbt-rt S. Autrey Professor of Political Science and Professor of Statistics 
and Psychology at Rice Univcrsil)". 
Tabl(' I . Logistic Regrcssion Results for the Likelihood of Rcturn 
~1.u l Sllnc} IIOU' lon SlIn cy 
V;m ablc Cocff SE M~r'lIlal .. ff,x·c-~ SI' C..,..ff. SE M,Jrglll:d .. ffech " 
CONSTANT 1.005 0.649 - 2.239 0.595 - 0.440 
INCOME 0.040" 0.016 0.003" 0.00 I 0.003 0.01 5 0.000 
INCOME2 - 3.0 x 10 .... 1. 2 x 10 
, 
- 2.0 x 10 
' 5 __ 
1.0 x 10 
, - 7. I X IO fl 1.9 x 10 , - 1.4 X I0 6 
COLLEGE 0.297 0.294 0.02 0.019 - 0.397- 0.203 - 0.075--
U NDE R30 0.11 3 0.351 0.007 0.022 - 0.56 1" 0.180 - 0.114--
SEN IO R - 0.607- 0.331 - 0.047" 0.029 0.329 0.861 0.069 
NO MA - 0.976-- 0.346 - 0.Q78-- 0.032 1.054-- 0.400 0.163" 
PERCDAM - 0.3 1 0.738 - 0.021 0.05 0.4 73 OA02 0.093 
MALE 0.265 0.256 0.018 0.018 - 0.052 0.1 76 - 0.010 
BLAC K 0.229 0.409 0.0 14 0.024 
CAJUN - 0.134 0. 57 - 0.009 0.042 
PAR ISH - 0.649- b 0. 34 - 0.055 0.Q35 
IMPACT 1.428-- 0.374 0.124-- 0.04 
WO RKI NG 0.672" 0.219 0. 125--
MARRIED 0.544-- 0.222 0. 115--
C HILDREN 0.037 0.049 0.007 
OWN HOME 0.962-- 0.254 0.214--
Ll VEDY R 0.009 0.010 0.002 
WAGEDIFF - 0.287" 0.059 - 0.056--
Obs. 746 756 , 
Pscudo-R- 0.176 0.086 
Log L - 216.458 - 4 15.679 
CodT .. "OCffil·IC"I. Oln .. obscrH-d 
• Marll mal effecl' of t h .. dumm~ ,anablc-.. ,.I re rom putoo "nh the change-< In 11M: probab,lit ,c<; othe l'" I ~. margmal cff~'Cl s ;. re ~""3l l1a\(~d ,.II IhOSl: obSl.·n 00 mcans. 
h The PARISII ';In •• ble " SCI 100 for the IMP,' CT ,:ampJc. 
• Slgmr ... -,J~;1I IO'C k , d 
•• S'gm rlC;l tII,'\:,J1 S"tt lewl 
,... 
~ 
SE 
, 
". 
'-
0.114 , 
0.003 -,... 
3.8 x 10 
, 
0.037 
0.037 
0. 192 
0.045 
0.079 
0.035 
0.039 
0.050 
0.010 
0.061 
0.002 
0.012 
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household size. Fin:llly. the real wage different ial (e,) for the household's sk ill level and job 
elassification associated with the home and host locations could be included in Ihe specification 
of Equation 5. 
Unlike the linear regression model. the parameter estima tes for the logit model "re 
interpreted as thc ratc of change in the log odds of return as the characteristics ch'Hlge. which is 
not very intuitive. Therefore. the marginal effects of the individual and household 
ch.mlcteristics on the probability o f re!Urn are also calculated. as follows (Greene 2003): 
(6) 
The marginal effects arc evaluated at the observed mean values. whidl arc reported in Table 2. 
For dummy variables. rn:lrginal effects arc compllled with the use of the changc in the 
proba bi Ii tics. 
Table 2 reveals slTiking d ifferences across our two samples. The mail sample corresponds 
with a higher income. a more highly educated. and an older populatio n. This popul'llion "I so 
has fewer African Americans than the Houston sample. 10 Almost a third o f the mail sa mple 
livcd in the New Orleans metropolitan area before Hurricane K;lIrina. whereas the Houston 
sample is predominantly composed of eV<lcuees from New Orleans (92%). Six percent of mail 
survey respondents claimed to have Acadian (or "Cajun") heritage. Fo r the subset of mail data 
for which we had measures ofsoeial cOlHlcction (survey 2). 35% of responden ts repOrl that they 
were born in the parish o r county in which they lived before Hurricane Katrina. We construe 
this as a proxy fo r con nection to place. Sixty-five percent of the Houston sample was engaged 
in the labor force before Hurricane Katrina. A small proportion. 13%. owned their own home. 
and the avemge re:>pondent had lived in the New Orleans area (or some other part of the 
affected region) for 26 years. Intentions to return across the two popUlations arc significantly 
diITerent- 88% for the mail survey versus 29% for the Houston survey. 
We report two sets of estimation results: the first on the basis of the mail surveys 
conducted by the Center for Natural I-i llz,nds Research at East Carolina University and the 
second on the basis of sel f-administered q uestionnaires of Katrina evacuees living in Houston. 
Table I rcports the logistic regression estimation results for the mail data. T he explanatory 
variables in Ihe estimated model ;Lre jointly significant (X] ::: 92.15). Results indicate that 
household income before Katrina. whet her the residence waS located in the Nell' Orleans 
metropolitan area. whether the respondent is a sen ior citizen. and whether the respondent was 
born in the parish/coulllY in which they lived before the storm, have a statistically signilicant 
innuence on the evacuce's return decision . T he coefficient of household income is positive. 
ind icating lhat higher income households 'Ire more likely to return to thei r pre-Katrina 
residence. but the innuence diminishes with income (negative quadra tic term). 
Controlling for the percentage of damage in a county. residents of the Nell' Orleans 
met ropolitan a rca arc less likely to return home. all else being equal. New Orleans residents are 
7% less likely to reHlrn. Senior citizens arc almost 5% less likely to return. The parish-born 
pam meter estimate is negative. indic'Hing that those respondents that were born in the parish or 
county in which they lived before Ka trina arc less likely to return. This result is counter to our 
expectations because we envisioned this covariate as ,Ill indicator of social connection to place. 
'" ,\ 1IIIoIIgli SUlTlm,try SL~lisL ics for race arc no, prQv,ded \\',tll tile Houston d"'a. mo" of the respondent. to ,tl1~ survey 
wc,.· African Americans. 
T llble 2. Variablc Detin il ions :md Sum mary Slatislics 
\'~n~blc 
R ET U R N 
INCO M E 
CO LLEGE 
UN D E R30 
SEN IO R 
NOMA 
PERC DAM 
MALE 
BLA C K 
CAJ UN 
IM PAC T 
PAR ISH 
WORKI NG 
MARRI ED 
C HILDREN 
OW NHOM E 
LlVEDYR 
WAGED IFF 
.XSl:npnon 
Returning 10 pre- Katrina residencc ( = I) 
Household a nnual income in thoUS<lIlds of dollars 
At lended colle~e ( '" I) 
Age under 30 ("' 1) 
Age o\'cr 63 ( co I) 
Residcncc located \\ ilhin Ihe New O rle:lns Metropolitan :Irea 
Percentage of damagoo property in county 
G ender a nswered as male I:: I ) 
Race-et hn ic gro up answered :IS black ( - I ) 
Race-el hnic group answered :.s Caj un ( = I) 
Obscrv;lt ion from Econo mic Imp:!el survey (su rvcy I of ma il portion)" (= I ) 
Bo rn in parish/county of residenccb ( = I) 
Employed befo re Kat rina (= I) 
~'I a r ried ("" I ) 
Number of ch ild ren 
Own homc residcncc (;. I) 
Number of years li\'oo in Ncw OrlCllllS 
Real wage d iITcrencc by labor cl:tss (Houston wage - NOLA w:tge) 
The summar)' st a ti~IICS ror the mail sur-c)' IS based on ' ''6 obser\alions. The sample SIze for the Houston .lIner is 756 . 
• IM I'/\ CT u31a did not record mrormallon on soci3Ufanllly connl"CIIOn$ to the hOI1H.'location. 
M:u. Sun'c} 
Mc~n S I) 
0.887 0.316 
51.434 32.560 
0.-130 0.495 
0.208 0.406 
0.256 0.437 
0.316 0.465 
0.449 0.232 
0.540 0.499 
0. 129 0.335 
0.067 0.250 
0.677 0.468 
0.348 0.478 
b IX>Crlpll\C stat i'lies for PA H I 511 correspond ""Hh the SUbSl:I of l h~ m~11 u;lln thnt recorded sociaUran1l1), ronnl"Ctioll) (II - 2" II, 
, -
" 
-". 
~ -l louston Surw) ~ 
~ 
Mean SO 
0.290 0.45-1 
18.7O.J 15.887 
0.328 0.-170 
0.640 0.480 
0.008 0.089 
0.923 0.266 
0.452 0.21 4 
0.508 0.500 
0.652 0.477 
0. 171 0.376 
2.0 15 1.803 
0. 128 0.335 
25.737 8.963 
1.553 2.049 
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which wo uld lead us to expect a positive coefficient. In any even t. the marginal elTeet is not 
statistically significant. Finally. the econo mic impact d.lla set (survey I) exh ibited a higher 
likelihood of return . Unfortu nately. bcc:luse of missing :lnd inconsistent data. we were not able 
to record w:lge diITerelltials correspond ing with the home and host region for the mai l sample. 
Table I also reports thc cst imation results fo r the Houston data set. Results indic:lte that 
education level. age. employment status. marital status. and homc ownership infl uence the 
likelihood of return . Respondcnts with at least a college level education and those under the age 
of 30 arc less likely to return . Respondents th:lt were working before Kat rina are more likely to 
return home. as arc married respondents. Ho me ownership has a sign ificant influence on the 
likelihood of return. increasing the probability by 21 %." 
The Houston model also includes the wlige dilTerenti:ll. For this data SCI. the real wage 
diITerential ( IIID)) fo r j la bor classification is defined as 
CPI /I<M' II'D = 11'11,,,, _ 11'11" ..... 
) J C P 1/1,,,,... J (7) 
where III/'Q·" :md "'l'm,w denole an hourly mean wllge in Houston and the home location 
(primarily New Orle' lIls). respectively. for j labor classi fication in May 2005. and e l'l l/<MI and 
CPI" '''''' denote the consumer price index for Houston and the home location. respectively. as 
of May 2005. 12 The average real wage differential was SI.55 per hour. ind icating that. o n 
:tverage. households in the l-IouslOn s:tmple could earn more money by staying in the Houston 
arca . The coeflicient on wage dilTerential is negative and statistic:t lly significant. A SJ.OO 
increase in the wage differential decreases the likelihood of return by almost 6%. We use 
Equat ion 4 to calculate ilverage IVTP to return home. Our point estimate is Sl.94 per hour 
(2005 U.S. do llars) wi th a 95% confidence interval of SI.79 :md S2.3O (Krinsky and Robb 
1986). The dummy variable ind icating the New Orleans metropoli tan area captures site-specific 
amenity alTeets of return migration fo r the majo rity of the sample vis-il-vis other G ulf locations. 
Beyond this dichotomy for the return loea tion. o ur WTP measure assumes no intrasite 
variation in loe.llion-specific amenities (i.e .. homogeneity of <lmenit ies within the Houston and 
home sites) and homogeneity of amenity perceptions within the popul<ltion of interest. 1.I 
6. Discussion 
Our results provide insight into the return mi gration decision of households that have been 
displaced by nat ural diSllstcr. The displacement of people can have majo r social. psycho logical. 
and economic implicat io ns. Rcse .. rchers ha\'e ex.tm ined the evacuat ion decision. the effect that 
II For Ihe HOUSlon data set. we also csllmaled <In ordered logit regression u,lng Ihe dependent variabtc wllh the "alues of 
\'cr~ unli k cl~. somewhm unlikely. somewhal likely. lind highly likely cmegorles. The sign and >igniflc~ncc of mOSI 
coefficlcnt s ~rc 1he s.ame HS Ihe 10g,1 regression . We onl)' reporl Ihe resulis from Ihe logi1 regression 10 compare the 
~sulis wnh the mail sur.'e). 
II The " -age data come from the Bureau of Labor Slali.lia (DLS 20(5) weMlIe . The d:lla pro\'idcd wage es"ma l~ for 
oler goo occupallons by Iwgrnph,e area . TIle "'ebsne Stales "Ihc-se est imales arc C".tkulaled .. -ilh dJla collecled from 
C1I1ployc~ in all indu_try SCCIO~ in melropolilan <lnd non-melropolitan <lreas In CI'cr) Siale and the ])'Slnct of 
Columb,a." 
" Varialion in amenili~'S " 'il hin sill'S is largely unobserved because of da ta hmHatl0ns. 
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evacuees have on their host region. ,md the social and psychological elTects of the disaster and 
displacement 011 evacuees. There has been much less research 14 on an important aspect of 
recovery- which households will subsequently return and why? Our sense is that many have 
assumed in the past that all or most evacuees will return. but this is not nccessarily so. especially 
for large dis<lsters that cause mass destruction and highlight the vulnerability of a particular 
area. Damage rrom the disaster. perception of vulnerability of the home community. 
expectation of economic conditions. the behavior of family and friends. and connection to 
place cou ld all influence the likelihood of return. The magnitude and composition of the 
returning population has implications fo r d isaster recovery. 
We postulate a sim ple benefit- cost structure on the return decision in order 10 conduct 
empirical analysis of two unique data sets. The first corresponds with evacuees from the Gulf 
region that responded to one of two mail surveys. Although the mail surveys were designed 
primarily fo r other purposes (to measure evacuation behavior and expenditures in one case and 
opinions of rebuilding project in the other). we arc able to assess the respondent's intentions of 
returning to their home after evacUlHion. The adjusted overall response rate to these two 
surveys is approximately 22%. We make no claim that Ihis sample is represent,Hive of 
households in the Gulf region. Nonetheless. we can ,Issess what influences the likelihood of 
return to learn somethi ng about the decision-milking process. 
Our results suggest th:1t household income influences the likelihood of return. although the 
marginal clTect is rather small- a SIOOO increase in household income increases the likelihood 
of return by 0.3%. Residents of metropolitan New Orleans arc 7% less likely to return homc. 
The metropoli tan area includes coun ties most heavily damaged by Katri lw; however. estimates 
suggest that the percentage of houses with damage docs not significantly affect overall 
likelihood of return . Given the nonuniform damage dis tributions within a county. the county-
level aggregation in this covariate could be a sou rce of inaccuracy. A particularly vulnentble 
group. senior citizens. arc less likely to return 10 their home (marginal effect = -5%). This 
result could reflect heightened perceptions of vulner:tbility in this popul:nion. 
We were surprised to fi nd that individuals born in the parish or county in which they lived 
beforc Katrina were less likely to return. although the marginal elTect for th is variable was not 
sta tistically significant. We hypothesized tha t sense of place wou ld be stronger among these 
individuals. and thus likelihood of return would be gre'lIer. but the data do not support this 
content ion. Indicator v,lriables for paren ts being born in the counly (or a nearby coun ty) in 
which the individual lived proved to have no influence on the pal\ern of return migr:ttion 
responses. Moreover. those that consider themselves Caj un (Acadian) are no more likely to 
return than other respondents. Research suggests :1 possible explanation for this finding- the 
extent of damage tends to cause more distress to people with deep roots in 11 particular 
envi ronment (Albrecht 2006). Thus. those with deeper conncctions to place migh t be more 
highly traumatized. leading to a lower likelihood of return. 
Our results for the mail sample differ somewhat from those of Elliott and Pais (2006). 
They exam ined the return migration decision with interval-scllied datl! and ordinary least 
squares. finding that only houschold income. home ownership, and whether the respondent's 
home was destroyed influenced the return migration decision. However. they found that 
.. Elliot! and PaIs (2006\ ar~ tnc onty author~ tnal W~ arc awarc of to e~aminc Inc return migra tion dOXlsion in 
a quanlilalilc framework . Falk. Hunl. and lium (2006) spcculalc o n ho" Ine demographics of Nc,," Orleans mignl 
change in Inc " 'akc of HUrricane Kalrina. 
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income has a neg'Hi ve effect on the likelihood of return. as does loss of home. where:ls home 
ownership has 11 positive effect. They found no innuence of age or place of residence (New 
OrJe1Uls 'Is. olher Gulf Coast communi ties) on return migration. African Americans were no 
more or less likely to return in their model: we find similar results with regard to race. 
Ou r second data set corresponds wi th primarily minority K'l1rin'l evacuees in Houston. 
Ou r logistic regression resul ts suggest that education. age. employment status. m:Hit:ll sWtus. 
and home ownership influence the likelihood of return. Respondents with at least a college level 
education are 7% less likely to return home than are the less educated. Those under the age of 
30 are 11 % less likely to return. Respondents that were working before Kat rina are 9% more 
likely to return home than those that were not working. and married respondents are 11 % more 
li kely to return home. Similar to Ellion and Pais (2006). home ownership has a large influence 
on the likelihood of return . increasing the probabi lity by 21%. Household income has no effect 
on the likelihood of return for this sample. nor does the number of years that the respondent 
lived in the area before evacuation. The fo rmer coefficient likely reflect s the low variability of 
income in the Houston data: the laner covariate was included as a proxy for connection to 
place. and again we find little support for this aspect influenci ng the likelihood of return . 
Neither of our models finds that the extent of damage in a county innuences return migration. 
but there could be error in this variable (as noted above). 
Returning briefly 10 Table 2, we no te that major differences between the two subsamples 
are along age, racial. and household income tincs. In particular. the mail sample exhibits a much 
higher annual income (55 1.000 compa red with $ 19.000). tends to be older. and is more heavily 
non- African American. [t would be remiss were we not to point to these qualitative differences 
and their possible implications, as intentions fo r return migration vary significantly across the 
two subsamples- 89% for the mail sample and only 29% for the Houston sample. Although the 
income effects arc smalt or insignificant in the parametric regression models, we do sec a clear 
pat tern in the summary statistics across the two subsamples. A liberal reading of this pattern of 
results might suggest that wealthier, older. non- African American households are more likely 
to return to the post-Katrin:t Gulf region. 
With the Houston data set. we examine not only the influence of household 
characteristics, but also individual-specific wage difTerentials. The economic literature on 
migration haS long recognizcd that labor market condi tions influence migration patterns. as do 
the prices of location-specific goods and the levels of spatial amenities. [n a world of 
homogeneous agen ts with perfec t information, with no con nection 10 place, and in which 
moving was cost less and could be instantaneously realized, the eq uilibrium levels of wages and 
rents should adjust to renect the value of location-specific ameni ties <Roback [982). Under 
these conditions. utility levels of consumers and profits of firms would be equalized across 
space. Wages wou ld be higher and land ren ts lower in areas with poor llmenities. whereas 
amenity-rich locations would pay lower wages and witness higher land rents. 
A number of migration studies have found persistent differentials in wages across regions 
while cont rolting fo r amenities (Clark and Cosgrove 1991 : Greenwood et at. 1991). Cultu ral 
constraints are one f"cto r that could foster persi stent wage di fferent ia ls (Frey and Liaw 2005). 
Indi vidual need for soci .. l support networks. kinship tics, and access to informal employment 
opportunitics co uld influcncc migration pattcrns. Information nows are influenced by social 
networks, which co uld inhibit or distort knowledge of prices, wages. and amenities at other 
locations. Connection to place in which an individual has li ved could also inhibit out -
migration. 
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We include a num ber o f proxies for connection to plilce (which for our purposes cou ld 
relate to sense of identity. kinship tics, social networks, or ot her cu ltural constraints) in our 
regression models. We fi nd linle influence of these factors on the likelihood of return. These 
results could reflect the unimportance of place in the return migration decision, the poor quality 
of our proxies, or misspecilication of the place phenomenon in ollr regression models. 
Nonetheless, we arc able to milke inferences ilbout the value o f returning homc with the usc of 
individual-specific wage differentials fo r tne Houston sample. 
Reill wage differellli:lls arc the differences in hourly earnings at home and host locations 
for a respondent's job class. controlling fo r home and host region price levels. T he average 
(median) real wage diITerential is $ 1. 55 (SO.71 ) per hour. ranging frOIll -55.74 to $ 12.78. Less 
than 5% o f the wage differentials were negat ive. implyi ng that Houston offers higher rea l wages 
for the overwhelming majority of the evacuees. Although we arc unable 10 cont rol fo r lII11enity 
levels across the home and host region. we do find the expected negative effecl of w<lge 
differenti,,1 o n the likelihood o f return. Heca usc a larger wage d iITercnce im plies tha! the 
individual faces higher opportunity cost o f retu rn. we interpret the w:lge differential as a n 
implicit price of return. It is illl estim:lte of the amount o f hourly income that they Illust give up 
to return home. 
Our willingness 10 pay model in Equat ions 1--4 formalizes the relationship between the 
economic benefit of ret uming home ilnd the cost implied by the wage di fferential. The Ho uston 
data suggest tllllt some evacuees choose to return home even though they could earn a higher 
wage at their host location. In this sense. H urricane Ka trina provides a natural experi ment for 
anal yzing migration decisions. Individuals that mi ght have never left their home arc suddenly 
presented with the opport unity to migrate by making their evacuiltion decisio n permanent. T he 
natural disaster provides an exogenous shock to the spatial pallern of labor tha t cou ld allow 
one to lIssess the underlying ca uses of persistent wage different ials. 
We employ the WTP formula in Equation 410 estimille the benefit of returning ho me. Our 
results suggest that the llverage individ ual is willing to sacri fice S I. 94 an hou r in higher wages 10 
return home, with il 95% confidence interva l of SI.79 ilnd 52.30 (2005 U.S. dollars). For an 
individual employed fu ll time. this im plies an annual willingness to pay o f S3954 (95% 
confidence interval S3651 S4692). Alt hough connection to pilice liS we have defin ed it might 
not be the factor motivating return migrat ion. the d:lla suggcst that somet hing draws 
ind ividuals to return home in the face of real and significant economic cos\. 
7. Conclusion 
Natural disasters Cilll unleash widespread death and destruction. displace hundreds o f 
thousands of people. and cau~e majo r interruptions in the everyday economic life of still greater 
populations. Economists have examined evacuation, recovery, and transition but have not 
looked at the mierocconomic decision of d isplaced households 10 return home. We explore the 
cvacuation- migration decisions o f Hurricane Kat rina survi vo rs with two unique datil sets thilt 
include stated preferences on return migrat ion. Fo r a sample of evacuees in various locations. 
we find that ho usehold income increases the likelihood of returning home. This result is in line 
with o ur expectiltions, in thilt households with higher income have better resources to rHilke the 
return trip, ilre more likely 10 own homes in areas less likely to have been nooded . lllld have 
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bener resources to rebuild in the C\'eIH that their home h;ls been dam;tged. However. this resu lt 
differs from the only other empirical amllysis that we arc aware or. which fi nds 11 negative 
relationship betwecn income and likelihood of return (Elliott and Pai s 2006). Senior ci tizens 
and residents of metropolitan New Orleans arc less likely 10 return home. Percentage of 
da maged homes in a county docs not inOuence the likelihood of return. blLl Ihe aggregate level 
of this mcasure complicates interpretation. 
Our second model deals with a data set of evacuees in Houston. The Houston evacuee d:lIl1 
represent quite it unique population: the sample has a third of responden ts with less than a high 
school education. is o\'erwhelmingly African Amerielill (over 98%). and almost half of the 
respondents report incomes less than S15.OOO per year. For this population. we find that 
educa tion and yout hful ness (being under 30 years of age) decrease the likelihood of relUrn. 
whereas those who were employed before Katrina. those who arc married. ilnd those who own 
a house are more likely to rcturn. Homc ownership h:IS a large inOuence on the likelihood of 
return . increllsing the probability by 21 %. These sets of resul ts arc useful in Iheir own right in 
that they provide insight into the nature of the return migration decision. allow one to make 
inferences about how the economic and cultura l recovery of an area could proceed. and suggest 
policies that might lIid in recovery. 
For the Houston sample. we are also capable of exploring Ihe relationship belween wage 
differentials in the home and host region and the likelihood of return. We cxa mine wage 
d ilTeren lials in light of the litenn ure on economic migration. in which households are assumed 
to son over space ;lccording to wages. the prices of loc:nion-specific commod ities (e.g .. land). 
;lIld spatial amenities. The persistence of significant wage differentials after contro lling for land 
rents and sp:lIial amenities suggests that some componelll of behavior forestalls spatial 
arbit rage. Cultural conSl raints. such as kinship relations o r connection to placc (Frey and Liaw 
2005). cou ld operate to inhibit migr;Hion. 
Although we find no evidence tha t proxies for what we call "connect ion to pilice" alTeet 
the likelihood of retu rn migration in either of our (hua sets. we do find that households intend 
to return home in spi te of real economic costs in terms of real wage differentials across the 
home and hosl lac:nion. We exploit individ ual variation in wage differentials to estimate the 
effect on the likelihood of return and find a statistically significant :md negative effect- those 
thai face higher opportunity costs of return in terms of higher relative real wages in Houston 
tend to st:ty in Houston. whereas those thai face lower o r negative opportunit y costs tend 10 
return. A signal of value thai one could a\tribute 10 return ing home is that some individuals will 
accept lower wages to do so. For the sample of Houston evacuecs. we est imale Ilwl Ihe average 
household is willing to give up $ 1.94 per hour to return home. Assuming thai the ellrning 
individUll1 works fu ll time. this corresponds wi th an annual WTP of $3954. These numbers an:: 
limited in their ilpplicllbi lity because of the unique characleristics of the Houston sample. bu t 
the resul ts arc encouraging and suggest that Ih is approach should be explored funher with 
other data sets. 
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